|
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 14-15 FEBRUARY 1945 BOMBINGS OF DRESDEN
Prepared by: USAF Historical Division Research Studies Institute Air University
I. INTRODUCTION:
1. The reasons for and the nature and consequences of the bombing of Dresden, Germany, by Allied air forces on 14-15 February 1945 have repeatedly been the subject of official and semi-official inquiries and of rumor and exaggeration by uninformed or inadequately informed persons. Moreover, the Communists have with increasing frequency and by means of distortion and falsification used the February 1945 Allied bombings of Dresden as a basis for disseminating anti-Western and anti-American propaganda. From time to time there appears in letters of inquiry to the United States Air Force evidence that American nationals are themselves being taken in by the Communist propaganda line concerning the February 1945 bombings of Dresden.
II. ANALYSIS: Dresden as a Military Target
2. The purpose of this historical analysis, based in its entirety on existing official documents and on standard reference sources, is to provide a more detailed and definitive account of the reasons for and the nature and consequences of the February 1945 Dresden bombings than has heretofore been available. The narrative portion of this historical analysis sets forth a framework for arriving at definitive answers to such recurring questions concerning the February 1945 bombings of Dresden as the following:
a. Was Dresden a legitimate military target?
b. What strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and to the Russians, underlay the bombings of Dresden?
c. Did the Russians request that Dresden be bombed by allied air forces?..
9. In addition to its geographical position and topography and its primary importance as a communications center, Dresden was, in February 1945, known to contain at least 110 factories and industrial enterprises that were legitimate military targets, and were reported to have employed 50,000 workers in arms plants alone.8 Among these were
- dispersed aircraft components factories;
- a poison gas factory (Chemische Fabric Goye and Company);
- an anti-aircraft and field gun factory (Lehman);
- the great Zeiss Ikon A.G., Germany’s most important optical goods manufactory; and, among others,
- factories engaged in the production of electrical and X-ray apparatus (Koch and Sterzel A.G.), gears and differentials (Saxoniswerke), and electric gauges (Gebruder Bassler).9
10. Specific military installations in Dresden in February 1945 included barracks and hutted camps and at least one munitions storage depot.10...
The Specific Ways and the Degrees to Which the Dresden Bombings Achieved or Supported the Strategic Objectives that Underlay the Attack and wars of Mutual Importance to the Allies and the Russians:
39. The Allied bombings of Dresden on 14-15 February 1945 were one of many major air actions undertaken to bring about the defeat of Germany by a combination of Allied air operations, of Allied ground operations against Germany from the west, and Russian operations against Germany from the east. No single action, whether by land, sea, or air, could of itself bring about the defeat of Germany. Each specific action, through whatever medium or by whatever force, was--if successful--an action that contributed to ultimate victory. The Allied bombings of Dresden were by no means either the largest or the most important air actions that were specific contributions to the defeat of Germany. Nevertheless, the bombing of Dresden was by its design and the degree of success achieved a highly significant air action.
40. The major significance of the Dresden bombings lay in the fact that they were among several immediate and highly successful air actions made in response to the specific Russian request, given by General Antonov at the ARGONAUT Conference, less than two weeks earlier, for Allied air support of the Russian offensive on the Eastern Front. Had the German communications centers leading to that front--among which Dresden was uniquely important--act been successfully attacked by Allied strategic air forces, there can be little doubt that the course of the European war might have been considerably prolonged.90 At the time of the Dresden bombings, Marshal Koniev’s armies were less than seventy miles east of Dresden and by virtue of their extended positions highly vulnerable to German counterattack, provided the Germans could pass reinforcements through Dresden.91 With communications through Dresden made impossible as a consequence of the Allied bombings, the Russian salient in that area was rendered safe throughout the ensuing months of the war.92
41. Of secondary significance, but by no means negligible, was the destruction or disruption of Dresden’s manufacturing activities, particularly of military goods, and the further reduction of Germany’s critically short railway rolling stock and operating facilities. Again, the death and destruction inflicted on the largest German city that had not before undergone large--scale bombing was almost certainly a major contribution to the final weakening of the will of the German people to resist. While the Americans, happily, cannot and would not claim credit for this aspect of the Dresden bombings, the fact remains that the RAF area raid on the city was the last of the instances during World War II in Europe when the shock effects of area bombing resulted in nearly total demoralization of a great enemy city.93
42. The ultimate significance of the Dresden bombings in terms of the strategic objectives that underlay the attack and were of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians is evident in statements bearing on the last phase of operations that were designed to bring about the final defeat of Germany. On 28 March 1945, in a personal message to Marshal Stalin, General Eisenhower, outlined his plans for total defeat of the German ground forces in the west and stated that his final task would be to divide the enemy’s forces “by joining hands with your forces.”94 The best axis on which to effect the junction of forces, General Eisenhower stated, would be a line through Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden.95 On 1 April Marshal Stalin replied to General Eisenhower: “Your plan of dividing the German forces by means of the union of Soviet armies with your armies completely falls in with the plan of the Soviet High Command. I also agree that the place of the junction of your and the Soviet Armies should be in the area of Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden.”96 Less than four weeks later, on 27 April, American and Russian forces joined at Torgau, on the Elbe river near Leipzig, and Hitler’s Germany had been cut in two.97 Eleven days later, on V-E Day (8 May 1945), in the final military action in the war against Germany, Marshal Koniev’s armies entered and captured Dresden. The war in Europe was over.98
III. CONCLUSION
The foregoing historical analysis establishes the following definitive answers to the recurring questions concerning the February 1945 bombings of Dresden by Allied strategic air forces:
a. Dresden was a legitimate military target.
b. Strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians, underlay the bombings of Dresden.
c. The Russians requested that the Dresden area be bombed by Allied air forces.
d. The Supreme Allied Commander, his Deputy Supreme Commander, and the key British and American operational air authorities recommended and ordered the bombing of Dresden.
e. The Russians were officially informed by the Allies concerning the intended date of and the forces to be committed to the bombing of Dresden.
f. The RAF Bomber Command employed 772 heavy bombers, 1477.7 tons of high explosive and 1181.6 tons of incendiary bombs, and American Eighth Air Force employed a total of 527 heavy bombers, 953.3 tons of high explosive and 294.3 tons of incendiary bombs, in the 14-15 February bombings of Dresden.
g. The specific target objectives in the Dresden bombings were, for the RAF Bomber Command, the Dresden city area, including industrial plants, communications, military installations, and for the American Eighth Air Force, the Dresden Marshalling Yards and railway facilities.
h. The immediate and actual consequences of the Dresden bombings were destruction or severe damage to at least 23 per cent of the city’s industrial buildings; severe damage to at least 56 per cent of the city’s non-industrial buildings (exclusive of dwellings); destruction or severe damage to at least 50 percent of the residential units in the city’s non-industrial buildings (exclusive of dwellings); destruction or severe damage to at least 50 percent of the residential units in the city, and at least some damage to 80 per cent of the city’s dwellings; the total disruption of the city as a major communications center, in consequence of destruction and damage inflicted on its railway facilities; and death to probably 25,000 persons and serious injury to probably 30,000 others, virtually all of these casualties being the result of the RAF area raid.
i. The Dresden bombings were in no way a deviation from established bombing policies set forth in official bombing directives.
j. The specific forces and means employed in the Dresden bombings were in keeping with the forces and means employed by the Allies in other aerial attacks on comparable targets in Germany.
k. The Dresden bombings achieved the strategic objectives that underlay the attack and were of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians...
|
