от кайзера к республике и далее..
Одни из первых

ну так по сравнению с 1913г..

нет, стела, это просто "око за око"..
стерла мой пост - ничего страшного..
Но с Рублем и иже с ним - это как с негром на вэлфере:будешь не замечать его хамство - еще больше распоясается.....

Bekaa, the
Valley in central Lebanon, situated between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon mountain ranges; length 130 km/80 mi, width 20 km/12 mi. It is also a governorate (estimated population in 2002: 516,900), its main population centres being the city of Zahle and the ancient town of Baalbek. The Orontes and Litani rivers rise in the Bekaa. The southern part of the valley is particularly fertile with significant production of wheat, maize, cotton, fruit, and, in recent years, hashish and opium. Of strategic importance, the Bekaa was occupied by Syrian troops following the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in the mid-1970s and has been a centre of operations for the radical Islamic Hezbollah organization.

Yao
A people living in southern China, North Vietnam, northern Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar (Burma), and numbering about 4 million (1984). The Yao language may belong to either the Sino-Tibetan or the Thai language family. The Yao incorporate elements of ancestor worship in their animist religion.

The Yao are generally hill-dwelling farmers practising shifting cultivation, growing rice, vegetables, and also opium poppies. Some are nomadic.

Hmong
Member of a Southeast Asian highland people. They are predominantly hill farmers, rearing pigs and cultivating rice and grain, and many are involved in growing the opium poppy. Estimates of the size of the Hmong population vary between 1.5 million and 5 million, the greatest number being in China. Although traditional beliefs, which have many Taoist elements, remain important, many have adopted Christianity. Their language belongs to the Sino-Tibetan family. The names Meo or Miao, sometimes used to refer to the Hmong, are considered derogatory.

The Hmong of Laos, because of their strategic location, were cultivated by the US Central Intelligence Agency as a buffer against the neighbouring Vietnamese during the Vietnam War. After the US defeat in Vietnam 1975, the new government in Laos set out to exterminate the Hmong for their pro-American stance, employing chemical weapons, and Hmong refugees from Thailand were forcibly repatriated; around 100,000 Hmong perished.

The Hmong wear distinctive costumes and elaborate silver jewellery. Their villages are endogamous. They are relatively recent arrivals on the Southeast Asian peninsula, many having moved south in order to avoid harassment by Chinese imperial authorities. Today the Hmong live in China (Guizhou, Yunnan, Hunan), Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Myanmar (Burma).

Member of a people of the mountainous borderlands separating Thailand, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), and China. They are related to the Laos and Thais, and their language belongs to the Sino-Tibetan family.

Settled in fertile valleys, they grow wet rice and opium, and raise cattle. The Shan are stratified into commoners, aristocrats, and princes. The princes receive tribute from their people, taxes on trade goods, and act as warlords. Feuding is frequent, especially in connection with the opium trade, their only source of foreign income. Their religious beliefs incorporate both Buddhism and non-Buddhist elements.

Yi
Member of a people living in the mountainous regions of southwestern China, northern Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar, totalling about 5.5 million (1987).The Yi are farmers, producing both crops and livestock, and opium as a cash crop. Traditionally they were stratified into princes, aristocrats, commoners, and debt slaves. Their language belongs to the Sino-Tibetan family; their religion is animist.

===
Modern usage of the Uyghur ethnonym is used to give an ethnic definition to a traditional Central Asian distinction between nomads and settled farmers. It refers to the descendants of settled Turkic urban oasis-dwelling and agricultural populations of Xinjiang as opposed to those Turkic groups that remained nomadic. It is widely credited as having been used for the first time in 1921 with the establishment of the Organization of Revolutionary Uyghur (Inqilawi Uyghur Itipaqi), a Communist nationalist group with intellectual and organizational ties to the Soviet Union. There is some evidence that Uyghur students and merchants living in Russia had already embraced the name prior this date, drawing on Russian studies that claimed a linkage between the historical khanate and Xinjiang's current inhabitants. Official recognition of the Uyghurs came under the rule of Sheng Shicai, who deviated from the official Kuomintang "five races of China" stance in favor of a Stalinist policy of delineating fourteen distinct ethnic nationalities within Xinjiang.

The Chinese Republican era saw the most significant extension of Russian influence (in its Soviet form, of course) into Xinjiang that has ever occurred. It was inevitable that the Chinese and Russians should have clashed in this area, what with China's two thousand year-old claim on the territory as part of her rightful sphere of influence, and Russia's perennial concern to protect her southern and eastern flanks from Turkic and Islamic upheaval (and, later on, from British and Japanese designs in Central Asia). Both powers wanted to have Xinjiang as a buffer zone to protect themselves from the other. In addition, they both recognized the economic benefit of controlling the rich natural resources of the area. Although initially there may have been a legitimate concern on the part of the Soviets to extend Communism into Xinjiang, by the 1930s the expectation of an imminent World Revolution had been all but abandoned in the face of the need to build Socialism in the USSR. Thus, economic and strategic motives for controlling the province soon took priority over ideological ones.
What enabled the Soviets to so easily control Xinjiang during most of the Republican era, especially after the rise to power of Sheng Shicai? There are several apparent reasons. First, Xinjiang could not survive economically without trade with the USSR. The proximity of Soviet Central Asia and the common ethnic and cultural roots that Muslims on both sides of the border share made such trade inevitable. With trade came the opportunity for the Soviets to control the economy and hence the political structure of the province.

Second, the Republican government in Nanjing was too far away and too preoccupied with the Japanese invasion and the struggle with the CCP to be of much help to Xinjiang. When the inevitable internal upheavals arose, the government of Xinjiang had little choice but to turn to the Soviet Union in order to survive. Thus, the Soviets were able to intervene militarily in 1934, when Sheng was threatened by both the TIRET and the invading Dungans, and again in 1937, when the unrest in the south threatened to consume the whole province.

A third factor was the traditional influence that the Russians had exerted in the Ili Valley since their annexation of that territory in 1871. This remained an area in which they could count on local support for their plans right up until the end of the Republican era. Once Sheng made his break with the USSR in 1942, the northern region of the province continued to be an effective base of operations, from which they were able to assist Osman Batur in his fight against the provincial government in 1943 and to help establish the ETR in 1944.

Fourth, the deep ethnic divisions in Xinjiang also helped the Soviets in consolidating their power base in the province. Not only did the never-ending Muslim revolts give them a reason to intervene militarily, alternately on the side of both the government and the rebels, but the constant political instability that these insurrections produced guaranteed that there would be no one force strong enough to challenge Soviet power in Xinjiang. In addition, not only was there a strong antagonism between the Han Chinese and the Muslim population, but there were also deep-rooted divisions between the Chinese and Turkic Muslims. Furthermore, there were factions amongst the Turkic population of the province. In general, those in the south, around the Tarim Basin, were the most devoutly Muslim and therefore both anti-Han and anti-Soviet. Their goal was consistently a seccessionist Turkic-Islamic republic. Those living in the central portion of the province, around Urumchi, were the most accustomed to Chinese rule and not nearly so averse to it. So long as order was maintained, they were generally content to be governed by China. Finally, those living in the north were as antagonistic to Chinese rule as those in the south, but were much less serious in their devotion to Islam and either much more open to Russian influence, as in the Ili Valley, or primarily concerned with maintaining a nomadic lifestyle unhindered by any outside influences, as was the case amongst the Kazakhs of Jungaria. Thus, those in the north desired independence from Chinese rule, but they did not envision an independent Islamic state. 116

A fifth and final factor which should not be overlooked is the personalities of the chief characters involved. The Han Chinese warlords were customarily corrupt, repressive, and motivated by greed and personal ambition. Their policies only served to alienate their Muslim subjects and further destabilize the province. In addition, the ambition of Sheng to rule at any cost left him open to being used by the Soviets to acomplish their agenda. Personal ambition also played a part in the actions of those who opposed the government, thus enabling them also to be easily manipulated by the Soviets. Although each had different reasons for doing so, this occurred with most of the major players in Republican Xinjiang, including Khoja Niyas Hajji, Ma Zhongying, and Osman Batur. The subsequent political maneuvering of Burhan Shahidi and Saifuddin Azizov, as they switched their allegiance from the GMD and the CPSU, respectively, to the CCP, shows that this tactic of political survival is still alive and well in Xinjiang.

Urumqi
Industrial city and capital of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, northwest China, on the Urumqi River, at the northern foot of the Tian Shan Mountains; population (1999 est) 1,300,000. In the later 20th century the energy produced through exploitation of the large oilfield of the Dzungarian Basin and the extensive coal deposits near the Tian Shan contributed to considerable industrialization in the area. Industries include oil-refining, food-processing, brewing, and the manfuacture of cotton textiles, chemicals, cement, iron and steel, plastics, and agricultural equipment.

History
Urumqi was a small oasis settlement and trading post on the caravan routes west from China, strategically sited in a pass in the Tian Shan range separating the Tarim and Dzungaria basins. It was known as Dihua from 1763 when Xinjiang was incorporated into the Chinese Empire. The city was opened to foreign trade after the Sino-Russian Treaty of 1881, and made the capital of the newly-formed Xinjiang province of China in 1884. A sizeable number of refugees from the Russian Revolution settled there after 1917, when the city comprised three sections: an old Muslim community, a newer Chinese district, and a Russian quarter. It remained the capital of the warlords who governed Xinjiang from 1911 to 1950. The name of the city was changed to Urumqi in 1953.

Following 9/11, China stated its support to the United States of America in the war on terror and many human rights organizations are concerned that this is being used as a pretext to crack down on ethnic Uyghurs. Most Uyghur exile groups today claim their cultural rights are being suppressed by the Chinese government and that the PRC responds to Uyghur expressions of their culture, religion or demands for independence with human rights violations. A large proportion of the Uyghur diaspora supports Pan-Turkic groups and there are several organisations such as the East Turkestan Party. The name Xinjiang is considered offensive by many advocates of independence who prefer to use historical or ethnic names such as Chinese Turkestan, East Turkestan (with Turkestan sometimes spelled as Turkistan) or Uyghuristan

Link.